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Abstract The intra-generational redistribution in the Argentinean pension pro-
gram is assessed in a lifetime basis. Using household surveys, the lifetime flows of
labor income, contributions and retirement benefits are simulated. Then, the ex-
pected present values of pre- and post-social security labor income are computed.
The results show that the pay-as-you-go defined-benefit system appears to be re-
gressive, especially for women in the private sector. The results are robust to the use
of alternative discount rates and different definitions of pre- and post-social security
wealth. When income from informal jobs is taken into account, the system becomes
slightly progressive. A weak enforcement of the law makes the system less re-
gressive. Finally, in a counterfactual scenario in which there is no informal labor,
the system becomes almost neutral, even showing a small level of progressivity.
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1 Introduction
One of the reasons for the existence of compulsory contributory pension schemes is
to ensure that income earners save out part of their incomes to cover for their
expenditure needs when they retire from labor markets. The implicit assumption
behind the need for a compulsory regime is that otherwise people would not save
enough if the decision is left only on a voluntary basis. However, social security
(SS) programs are also used as tools to redistribute income from the better-off to the
worst-off. In the light of this second objective, it is usually the case that pension
formulas include, to a less or more extent, some redistributive components (e.g.
minimum pensions). Moreover, even retirement regimes based on the principle of
actuarial fairness, like individual accounts defined contribution (IA-DC) programs,
may also incorporate non-actuarial redistributive ingredients.
Also, SS programs redistribute income through more subtle mechanisms. High
mortality rates affect mostly to low-income workers when unified mortality tables
are used (Garrett 1995; Duggan et al. 1995; Beach and Davis 1998). Government
transfers to finance SS tend to favor the population covered by the programs which,
as Rofman et al. (2008) point out, in developing countries tend to be the better-off.
Low densities of contribution mean that some workers are left ineligible for benefits
which, as shown in Forteza et al. (2009) and Berstein et al. (2006), are mostly low-
income earners.
The aim of achieving a more progressive redistribution of income through the
design of pension regimes might collide with the objective of having systems that
are self-funded. This trade-off has been present along the history of almost all
pension programs around the world, Latin-America has not been the exception.
Examples of this have been the regimes changes in Argentina (2004–2008), Chile
(2008), Brazil (1988, 2003), Uruguay (2008) and Bolivia (2008), among others.
As explained by Bertranou et al. (2011), the reform in Chile has its origin in the
evidence that the system of individual accounts as designed in 1981 would meant
that most pensioners would obtain very low benefits when compared with their
incomes before retirement, with the most affected groups being low-income earners,
seasonal workers, self-employed, and mostly women. To avoid this scenario, the
reform of 2008 introduced a solidarity pension financed by the government, it also
implemented different measures to increase the system coverage, especially among
the most vulnerable groups mentioned above, and thirdly it looked at to improve the
rate of return of the individual accounts through more competition among the fund
administrators and the reduction of administrative fees. In the case of Brazil, the
reform of 1988 introduced the concept of universal coverage, the no-discrimination
against the rural population, and the protection of the real value of benefits. With
these aims, a non-contributory pension was introduced for people with disabilities or
older than 65-year-old that were in a situation of extreme poverty. While the reform
of 2003 looked at the harmonization of the many pension regimes in order to
minimize the inequalities between the general regime and the special ones. In
Uruguay, in 2008, the government introduced a series of changes to the pension
system looking at allowing that older people with insufficient contributions could
access to a retirement benefit. In this regards, there was a reduction, from 35 to 30,
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in the minimum years of contributions, while keeping the retirement age at 60 years,
while for unemployed workers with 28 years of contribution and 58-year-old it was
implemented an unemployment subsidy for a maximum period of 2 years. Also, a
non-contributory old-age pension was implemented for those in a more vulnerable
social situation.1 Finally, in the case of Bolivia, in 2008 it was implemented a
universal non-contributory pension for all citizens 60 years or older which is
financed with revenues that are not related to contributions made by workers and/or
employers.2 However, a challenge that needs to deal with is the huge unbalance
between the contributory and non-contributory pillars of the system.
Moving to the case of Argentina, which is the objective of this study, during the
first half of the 2000s there was a series of changes aimed at increasing the
proportion of the population with a pension benefit through the implementation of
several moratoriums allowing people which had not fulfilled with the required years
of contribution to have access to a pension benefit. However, in 2008, at the peak of
the world economic crisis, there took place an structural change, with the
abolishment of the mixed-system that was in place since 1994, and replaced by a
publicly administered pay-as-go defined-benefit (PAYG-DB) scheme.3 The official
reason put by the government behind this change was the intention of protecting the
value of the funds saved in the individual accounts, which had lost a great deal
because of the world economic crisis.4 However, another reason, maybe even more
important than the previous one, was the need by Federal Government, which was
unable to have access to world capital markets, of getting control over an
accumulated fund of around 29 billion USD, and not least important an annual flow
of nearly 4 billion USD in contributions previously diverted into the system of
individual accounts.
As can be appreciated from the examples just mentioned, in most cases the
objectives behind the reforms were to increase the share of the population covered
by the system and also to increase the replacement ratio of benefits. In what follows,
we focus on the Argentine case, more particularly in the redistribution stemming
from the fact that low-income workers tend to have systematically shorter
contribution histories.5 With this aim, we assess the implicit redistribution of the
Argentine pension program on a lifetime basis. Using household surveys we
simulate lifetime declared labor income and flows of contributions and benefits, and
1 Results from Forteza and Mussio (2012), Fajnzylber (2011) and Zylberstajn (2011) show that from a
intra-generational perspective, SS in Uruguay, Chile and Brazil induces to a more progressive
redistribution of lifetime income. Moncarz (2011) reports that for Mexico the pension system is almost
neutral from a distributional point of view.
2 This pension is financed with a 30 % of revenues from a direct tax on hydrocarbons, and also with the
dividends from privatized public enterprises.
3 The abolishment of the individual account part of the pension system took place in a record time of just
over a month.
4 A not minor reason behind the losses suffered by the funds accumulated in the individual accounts
during the year 2008, was the sharp reduction in the value of the public bonds issued by the Federal
Government which constituted by far the most important component of the investment portfolio. This
overexposure in government bonds was often the result of a government imposition on fund
administrators.
5 The impact of different mortality rates and different coverage on implicit redistribution is not assessed.
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compute the expected present values of income and net flows. Standard distribution
indexes are used to assess the distribution and redistribution implicit in the system.
The main finding is that the current PAYG-DB system in Argentina appears to be
slightly regressive, especially in the case of women working in the private sector,
these results are robust to the use of alternative discount rates and definitions of pre-
and post-social security wealth (SSW). If income from informal jobs is also
accounted for, the system becomes slightly progressive. A similar result emerges
under a weak enforcement of the system rules.
Our main finding that a solidarity system as the PAYG-DB that is in place in
Argentina is regressive appears to be at odds with the preconception that from a
distributional point of view this type of arrangements are more progressive than a
system with individual accounts, which almost by definition are actuarially fair. A
possible explanation for our result that the PAYG-DB system does not improve
income distribution is that if soft eligibility conditions were required, the system
would be unbalanced from a financial point of view since contributions from current
workers would not be sufficient to honor benefit payments, so the system requires
strict eligibility conditions, especially in terms of the number of years of
contributions, as well as low replacement ratios. This characteristic in an
environment where informal job is widely present, at least for some population
groups, means that many are left behind when reaching the age of retirement. This
question, which is not present in a framework of individual accounts, mostly affects
low-income earners, who are less likely to show compliance with the requirements
for access to a retirement.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework.
A brief description of the old-age pension program is presented in Sect. 3. Section 4
describes the data, while Sect. 5 presents the methodology. The main results are
discussed in Sect. 6, while Sect. 7 summarizes the main findings.
2 Conceptual framework6
Micro-simulations of lifetime labor income and SS contributions and benefits are
used to assess SS redistribution. The focus in this paper is on intra-generational
redistribution: one cohort, current pension rules. Even when they are not less
important, we do not analyse inter-generational transfers (e.g. between current
workers and current beneficiaries), nor among those reached by the system, either
because they have contributed during their working life and/or have access to a
benefit, and those that are never included by the system.
The individual is considered as the unit of analysis, but redistribution in the SS
system may look very different at the family level. Gustman and Steinmeier (2001)
find out that when analysed at the individual level, the US social security looks very
6 This section summarizes part of the proposal of the project ‘‘Assessing Implicit Redistribution
within Social Insurance Systems’’ developed with the support of the World Bank, which included five-
case studies: Argentina and Mexico (Moncarz 2011), Brazil (Zylberstajn 2011), Chile (Fajnzylber 2011)
and Uruguay (Forteza and Mussio 2012). A summary of these five-country studies can be found
in Forteza (2014).
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redistributive, favoring low-income workers, but it looks much less so at the family
level. Sadly, the lack of appropriate data impedes us to follow this route. Also, an
element that may reduce the difference between outcomes when considering the
family or the individual as the unit of analysis, is that differently from the US
system, the Argentinean case only allows for a ‘‘survivor benefit’’, while in the case
of the US there is a ‘‘spouse benefit’’ which is paid even before the main beneficiary
dies. Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) find that the ‘‘spouse benefit’’ is quantitatively
important, and implies more a transfer within the family itself than between
families.
Ideally, the assessment of the redistributive impact of social security programs
should be based on the comparison of income distribution with and without social
security. This is not the same as comparing pre- and post-social security income (i.e.
income minus contributions plus benefits), because social security is likely to induce
changes in work hours, savings, wages and interest rates. One possible drawback of
these models is the assumption of full rationality, something that has been subject to
much controversy, especially regarding long-run decisions like those involved in
social security. After all, the most appealed rationale for pension programs is
individuals’ myopia (Diamond 2005, chap. 4). In turn, much of fiscal incidence
analysis is done on the non-behavioral type of assumption (Sutherland 2001;
Immervoll et al. 2006). It is usually performed under the assumption that pre-tax
income is not affected by the tax system. The approach proposed here is closer to
the literature pioneered by Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004), who designed and
computed a series of indicators of SS incentives to retire assuming no explicit
behavioral responses.
The optimization models have the obvious advantage of incorporating behavioral
responses, so not only the direct effects of policies are considered, but also the
indirect effects that go through behavioral changes. However, in order to keep
things manageable, these theoretically ambitious models necessarily make highly
stylized assumptions regarding not only individual preferences and constraints, but
also social security programs. Given the goals of the proposed research, this is a
serious drawback. Non-behavioral micro-simulations are based on exogenously
given work histories and geared to providing insights on the social security transfers
that emerge from those histories. Thanks to their relative simplicity, non-behavioral
models allow for a much more detailed specification of the policy rules and work
histories than inter-temporal optimization models. An additional advantage of
micro-simulations is that the effects are straightforward, so no black-box issues
arise. At the very least, it can be expected to capture the first-order impact effects of
social security on income distribution. The micro-simulation modeling can thus be
seen as a first step in a more ambitious research program that incorporates
behavioral responses in a more advanced phase.
3 The Argentinean pension and unemployment programs
With small variations, Diamond (2006), Valde´s-Prieto (2006), Lindbeck and
Persson (2003) and Lindbeck (2006) classify social security systems according to
Lat Am Econ Rev (2015) 24:2 Page 5 of 35 2
123
three dimensions: the degree of funding, the distribution of risks, and the degree of
actuarial fairness.
PAYG programs are totally unfunded and so they lie at one extreme of the degree
of funding dimension. In these programs, benefits are entirely financed by the
current flow of contributions and there are no funds to back pension rights. At the
other extreme lie programs in which accrued pension rights are fully backed by
previous contributions. Individual savings accounts are the most common form of
fully funded pension schemes. In this case, pension rights are linked to accumulated
financial assets in the individual account.
In the second dimension, pension programs are usually classified as DB or DC. In
a DC program, contributions are fixed and benefits are residually determined,
adjusted to ensure financial sustainability. In a DB program, benefits are fixed—or
more commonly the relation between earnings and pension is settled in a formula––
and contributions are adjusted endogenously.
The third dimension refers to the link between individual contributions and
benefits. The program is actuarially fair if the expected sum of discounted benefits
and contributions are equal. It is said to be ‘‘non-actuarial’’ if there is no link
between contributions and benefits.
Most PAYG pension programs are DB and non-actuarial, and individual savings
accounts are in principle fully funded, DC and actuarially fair. But other
combinations are also possible. Non-financial-defined-contributions pension pro-
grams––also known as notional accounts––are totally unfunded (e.g. PAYG), and
yet they are DC and also exhibit high degrees of actuarial fairness. Many DB
programs have reserves that back pension rights, particularly so when programs are
relatively young.
PAYG-DB programs usually have some in-built redistributive components, like
minimum and maximum pensions, so they are often considered to be better
equipped in principle to perform redistribution than more actuarial DC programs
(Palmer, 2006). Pure individual savings accounts are actuarially fair and hence, by
construction, do not perform redistribution. In this light, if pension programs are
expected to alleviate poverty and reduce inequality in all age (Barr 2001), PAYG-
DB programs have an advantage over individual savings accounts. However, in the
real world it is not always clear whether PAYG-DB programs are effective in
alleviating poverty or reducing income inequality in old age. Also many saving
accounts programs are complemented with redistributive non-actuarial components,
like minimum pension guarantees and matching contributions. Therefore, whether a
program contributes to reducing inequality is an empirical issue.
In the US there has been an active debate over how progressive social security is
in practice. Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) on redistribution at the individual vs.
family level. Garrett (1995), Duggan et al. (1995) and Beach and Davis (1998) on
mortality rates. In developing countries, at least two additional factors may
contribute to reduce the ability of social security to ameliorate poverty and reduce
income inequality in old age. First, social security coverage is mostly limited to the
better-off (Rofman et al. 2008). Also governments often subsidize social security
and, given that coverage is very low among low-income individuals, these subsidies
may be regressive. Second, low-income individuals tend to have short work
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histories (Forteza et al. 2009), which in most DB programs imply reduced or even
no pension benefits at all (Forteza and Ourens 2012).
3.1 A brief history of Argentina’s social security7
In Argentina, the first pension funds appeared in the early of the 20th century (in
1904, the employees of the public administration, in 1905, the railway workers).
Between 1916 and 1930 the system extended to other activities, covering most
public employees; the financial, banking and insurance sector; journalists; printing
industry; merchant seamen and aviation workers. Despite the expansion of pension
funds, the overall coverage was quite limited, and also there was a high
heterogeneity among the different sectors, in terms retirement age, amount of
contributions, and benefits. However, one common feature was that of individual
capitalization.
Between 1944 and 1954 the system was extended further covering almost all
formal workers, although there was still a marked heterogeneity across sectors. This
last feature changed in 1954, when the system moved from one of individual
accounts to a one of PAYG type, also a progressive element was introduced with
low- and medium-wage workers receiving higher replacement ratios at retirement.
Another feature was that the system, due to its relative youth, enjoyed a financial
surplus, but this would change quickly.
In 1958, it was introduced the mobility in benefits, with a guarantee of 82 % of
the taxable wage that the beneficiary received before retirement. This element meant
a certain homogenization of benefits among the different sectors, and the
abolishment of the progressive component introduced with the 1954 reform. Also,
and perhaps the most important development, it was that with the maturation of the
system, and due to the existence of a high proportion of informal workers and high
levels of evasion in the payment of contributions, the system began to experience
deficits. These deficits led to a new reform in 1969, which involved the merge of the
various pension funds, and the introduction of a centralized management, this last
change in fact meant cross-sector transfers from those programs with surplus to
those with deficits. The reform also introduced more stringent conditions to access
to a benefit, with the increase of the minimum age and the number of years of
contributions. Also, the benefit would be a function of the worker’s earnings history,
calculated as an average of the best 3 years of salaries during the last 10 years of
work, which led to the replacement ratio to be between 70 and 82 %. The mobility
of the benefits was maintained. However, all these changes meant only a temporary
relief to the financial imbalances.
In 1980 a new reform contributed significantly to increase the system’s deficit,
with the elimination of employer contributions, and its replacement with resources
from the collection of the value added tax. The growing of informal employment,
evasion, and the greater maturity of the system led to the primary deficit to reach
60 % of total expenditures. This meant that in the eighties the system was almost
7 This section draws upon Basualdo et al. (2009).
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near the collapse, which meant the need for the reintroduction of employer
contributions.
Another reform, that meant a paradigm change, took place in October 1993 with
the reintroduction of the system of individual accounts that would coexist with the
public system. Under this mixed-system, the retirement benefit of the PAYG-DB
pillar was conformed of three parts, a flat payment, a benefit based on contributions
made before the reform, and another based on contributions made after the reform.
The latter two components were calculated based on the years of contributions and
the average wage received in the last years of work before retirement. For those who
chose to migrate to, or new workers that choose the system of individual accounts,
the total benefit also consisted of three parts. The same flat payment paid in the
public pillar, a payment based on the contributions made to the public system, and
other payment using the funds accumulated in the individual account. The first two
components were the responsibility of the public sector. After a minimum period in
one system, workers had the option to switch between systems. Even under the
individual account system there were some redistributive components through the
payment of a flat benefit, as well as the existence of a minimum pension. Benefits
paid by both systems that were the responsibility of the public sector, were financed
with contributions from employers and from workers belonging to the public pillar.
In the late 2008, at the peak of the global financial crisis, and under the official
excuse that the balances in the individual accounts were rapidly losing much of their
value, a last reform took place, and the individual account system was abolished.
However, the most general belief was that the measure was heavily influenced by
the needs of funding by the Federal Government. At that moment of the
abolishment, the funds accumulated in the individual account system were about 29
billions USD, but not less than half of that amount was public bonds issued by the
Government itself. These funds were used to constitute the Fondo de Garantı´a de
Sustentabilidad8 administered by the Administracio´n Nacional de Seguridad Social9
(ANSES). However, maybe the most important issue was that the Government, by
the intermediation of the ANSES, was able to take control over approximately, 4
billions USD each year in contributions made by employees that had in the past
chosen the individual account system.10
3.2 The current system
At the present time, there still coexist several retirement systems. On the one hand
there is the national system which covers private sector workers and federal public
employees, as well as people that work in the public sector in some provinces. At
the sub-national level, several provinces have their own systems which cover
provincial and municipal public employees; more or less half of these systems were
merged with the national system during the second half of the 1990s. Finally,
8 Sustainability Guarantee Fund.
9 National Social Security Administration.
10 With the abolishment of the individual account system, the ANSES has become one of the most
important sources of financing to the public sector, only behind the Central Bank.
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professional councils that regulate professional activities, such as engineers,
lawyers, etc., have their own systems that are organized at a provincial level. Even
more, both at the national and sub-national levels there is a wide number of specific
regimes covering specific activities, for instance the judiciary, university
researchers, etc. Finally, an additional component that has gained importance in
recent years is the widespread grant of non-contributory pensions.11 However, due
to data availability, the analysis here will concentrate only on the general regime
under the administration of the ANSES, which is the one with the largest
coverage.12
More specifically, the current system is regulated by the Law 24241. The
conditions salaried workers must meet to be entitled to a retirement benefit are the
following13:
• A minimum of 30 years of contributions
• To be 65-year-old for men and 60-year-old for women. Women, if they choose
to, can continue working until they are 65-year-old.
• People who do not meet the minimum years of contributions, can compensate
each year of missing contribution with two additional years of work, counted
after reaching the minimum retirement age.
People who do not meet the previous conditions can access an old-retirement
pension if:
• They are at lest 70-year-old.
• Have a minimum of 10 years of contributions.
• Have 5 years of contributions in the 8-year period previous to retirement.
The health and social security system is funded by contributions made by
workers and employers. Workers contribute an 11 % of the gross salary, while
employers contribute a 16 % to the retirement pillar of the social security system. In
June 2011, the maximum gross salary to calculate both contributions was A$
16213.72 (US$ 3925.85), while the minimum wage was $A 498.89 (US$ 120.79).
Workers also contribute a 6 % for health insurance and 1 % in case they choose to
affiliate to a trade union. Employers contribute an 8 % for health insurance.14
11 Lustig and Pessino (2012) show that non-contributory pensions as a share of GDP rose by 2.2 % points
between 2003 and 2009, while Argentina’s total social spending as a share of GDP increased by 7.6 %
points. The authors show that the increase in the weight of non-contributory pensions entailed a
redistribution of income to the poor, and from the formal sector pensioners with above minimum pensions
to the beneficiaries of the pension moratorium launched in 2004. At the moment of writing this paper a
new moratorium was launched, expecting to reach about half million new pensioners.
12 This regime represents, approximately, between 75 and 80 % of all beneficiaries, including survivor
benefits.
13 We exclude from the analysis people working under any other regime than salaried workers, such as
self-employed.
14 Employees’ contributions to health insurance are 3 % for their own coverage and another 3 % to
finance health insurance for those already retired. Employers’ contributions are also divided, but in this
case, 6 % is for the employee health insurance, while the remaining 2 % is for those already retired.
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Two others pillars of the system, which we do not include in the analysis below, are
unemployment insurance15 and the labor accident coverage.
With respect to the benefits, the monthly payment is divided into two parts:
• A flat benefit known as universal basic pension (PBU). In June 2011, the PBU
was A$ 667.92 (US$ 161.72). If the person retired under the old-age pension
scheme, the PBU is 70 % of the full amount.
• A compensatory payment (PC) that is equal to 1.5 % for each year of
contribution, or fraction above 6 months (with a maximum of 35 years) of the
average real gross salary (including the worker contributions to the social
security system but excluding the employer contributions) during the last
10 years before retirement. To calculate the average gross salary, periods in
which the person was not working are excluded. Despite of the legal norm
makes reference to the 10 years previous retirement, it is customary to consider
the last 120 positive remunerations previous retirement. In June 2011, the
maximum amount a person was entitled to receive under the PC was A$
10507.90 (US$ 2544.28).
• In June 2011, the System guarantied a minimum pension of A$ 1434.29 (US$
347.28).
4 Data
The data source is the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH) for the period
1995–2003.16 The EPH is a household survey that in its previous design was carried
out twice a year, usually in the months of April/May and October. Each household,
and all its individuals, was surveyed four consecutive times after which they were
dropped from the survey. In each survey, a quarter of households were replaced.
The sample we work with includes only individuals that have been observed the
four times and that at least in one occasion have declared themselves as employed or
unemployed. Working this way we feel we can approximate better the individual
effects that are crucial for our simulations.
The variable that identifies the contributing status to the social security is
available only for salaried employees. Thus, the sample will not include people that
have declared a different employment status than salaried employees, when
15 Unemployment insurance only covers private sector workers. However, the degree of coverage, both
in terms of number of beneficiaries as well as in monetary terms is very low.
16 From the second half of 2003 the EPH was subject to an important methodological change that
impedes us to extend the period of analysis, also because of the timing when households are surveyed, the
new EPH is less suitable for the purposes of the present study. Additionally, a second but not less
important reason for not using the new EPH, especially for the most recent years, is the growing
suspicions about the quality and truthfulness of the official statistics produced by the Instituto Nacional de
Estadı´siticas y Censos. Stating with consumer price statistics in 2007, official statistics has been since
subject to increasing scrutiny with growing accusations of tampering with the data. In 2009, in the middle
of the world economic crisis, suspicions also felt on poverty figures, and in the most recent years,
especially since 2012 also on employment rates and GDP figures.
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employed or in their previous job when unemployed, in any of the four
opportunities they were surveyed.
Because of the potential differences in the system coverage for the different types
of workers, the public and private sectors will be considered separately, as well as
men and women. Because of the low number of observations for each individual, we
cannot model, with a minimum degree of confidence, the transitions between the
private and public sectors, so we consider only individuals that when employed did
not change sectors. We only include individuals aged between 18- and 69-year-old
the four times they were surveyed. In Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4, we present some
descriptive statistics. The main picture is the high incidence of the not-contribut-
ing/working status, especially in the private sector, mostly for women.
5 Methodology
5.1 Estimation of contribution status
As it is clear from the sample description, there are an important percentage of cases
in which the individual is working but not contributing. This behavior is more
evident for those working in the private sector, especially for women. Because of
this characteristic that emerges from our sample, and under the assumption that
Table 1 Sample sizes






Table 2 Distribution of
samples depending on having
contributed at least in one out of
the four possible occasions
Source: own based on EPH
Public Private
Female Male Female Male
Contributed at least one time
No 13.8 5.7 61.9 26.8
Yes 86.2 94.3 38.1 73.2
Table 3 Sample working
status (%)
Source: own based on EPH
Public Private
Female Male Female Male
Working status
Not working 12.8 5.7 41.3 17.8
Working 87.2 94.3 58.7 82.2
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those individuals that contribute are not a random draw of the working population,
we use the Heckman selection model to control the bias that would emerge if the
contribution status were estimated without controlling for the probability that an
individual could have a job but does not contribute to social security. In particular,
we estimate the following model:
Lit ¼ bLXit þ eLit ð1Þ
Cit ¼ bCYit þ eCit ð2Þ
where, Lit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i is working and zero
otherwise; Cit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if, conditional on working (Lit = 1),
individual i contributes and zero otherwise; Xit is a set of variables that explain the
probability of individual i working; Yit is a set of variables that explain the prob-
ability of individual i contributing; t stands for a semester.
Under the assumptions of the Heckman selection model, eLit and e
C
it are correlated
with each other, such that the estimation of Eq. (2) without taking consideration of
(1) would render a biased estimation of vector bC.
Our aim with Eqs. (1) and (2) is to project the probability of an individual
working, and conditional on working the probability of contributing to social
security. Both of these probabilities surely depend on individual’s unobserved
characteristics. To try controlling this unobserved characteristic in our simulations,
we assume that the error terms in Eqs. (1) and (2) are composed of two parts:
eLit ¼ gLi þ uLit ð3Þ
eCit ¼ gCi þ uCit : ð4Þ
Equations (1) and (2) are estimated using the Heckman selection estimator, so
the individual effects gLi and g
C
i are recovered as follows:
g^Li ¼
PTi




Table 4 Sample contributing
status (%)
Source: own based on EPH
Public Private
Female Male Female Male
(a) All sample
Contribution status
Does not contribute 20.5 10.9 72.3 41.1
Contribute 79.5 89.1 27.7 58.9
(b) Conditional on working
Contribution status
Does not contribute 8.8 5.5 52.7 28.3
Contribute 91.2 94.5 47.3 71.7








where IMR are the inverse Mills ratio which are defined as IMRit ¼ / b^
LXitð Þ
U b^LXitð Þ, where /
and U stand for the normal pdf and cdf, respectively; k^ is the selectivity effect. Since
our aim is also to recover the individual effects, g^Li and g^
C
i , the contribution status
(Eq. 2) is assumed to be linear in its arguments, while for the working status (Eq. 1),
which is estimated with a probit specification, we work with its lineal projection.
Equations (1) and (2) allow us to model, in a pretty much ad hoc way, transitions
between informal and formal jobs. Sadly, the short time frame that each individual
is observed, does not allows us to use a proper transition model. Finally, another
element to keep in mind is that, since we are working with a non-behavioral model,
we do not control for the role that Social Security might have on the choice between
having a formal or informal job.
5.1.1 In sample simulations
The probability of individual i working at moment t is calculated as:
P^Lit ¼ b^LXit þ g^Li : ð7Þ
Then, the simulated working status is defined as L^it ¼ 1 if P^Lit[ drawLit and 0
otherwise, where drawLit is a realization from a uniform (0, 1) distribution for each
period t.
The probability of individual i, with individual effect g^Ci and conditional on being
working, contributing in time t is calculated as follows:
P^Cit ¼ b^CYit þ k^IMRit þ g^Ci : ð8Þ
Then, conditional on L^it ¼ 1, the contribution status for individual i in time t is
defined as C^it ¼ 1 if P^Cit [ drawCit ; and 0 otherwise, where drawCit is a realization
from a uniform (0, 1) distribution for each period t.
5.1.2 Out of sample simulations
Since in this case the individual effects gLi and g
C
i are not directly observed, they are
generated as follows:
~gLi ¼ r^gL~zLi ð9Þ
~gCi ¼ r^gC~zCi ð10Þ
where r^gL and r^gC are the standard deviations of the individual effects g^Li and g^
C
i
respectively, and ~zLi and ~z
C
i are both pseudo-random draws from a Standard Normal
distribution.
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The probability of individual i working at moment t is calculated as:
~PLit ¼ b^LXit þ ~gLi : ð11Þ
Then, the simulated working status is defined as ~Lit ¼ 1 if ~PLit[ drawLit and 0
otherwise, where drawLit is a realization from a uniform (0, 1) distribution for each
period t.
Then, the probability of contributing is calculated as:
~PCit ¼ b^CYit þ k^IMRit þ ~gCi ð12Þ
where t now stands for a month.
Then, conditional on ~Lit ¼ 1, the contribution status for individual i in month t is
defined as: ~Cit ¼ 1 if ~PCit [ drawCit ; and 0 otherwise, where drawCit is a realization
from a uniform (0, 1) distribution for each period t.
5.2 Projection of labor income
We estimate a maximum likelihood switching model17 which describes the behavior
of an agent with two regression equations and a criterion function, Iit that determines
which regime the agent i faces at time t.
Iit ¼ 0 if cZit þ uit  0
Iit ¼ 1 if cZit þ uit[ 0
Regime 0 Lit ¼ 1; Cit ¼ 0ð Þ : ln wit ¼ b0Xit þ e0it if Iit ¼ 0 ð13Þ
Regime 1 Lit ¼ 1; Cit ¼ 1ð Þ : ln wit ¼ b1Xit þ e1it if Iit ¼ 1: ð14Þ
Given that our main goal is to project income, we are particularly interested in
exploring the impact on wages of time invariant and deterministic covariates, like
age and education. In the equations above wit is the log of real wage
18 received by
person i in time t (semester); Xit is a set of regressors of personal characteristics, age
and education; and the unemployment rate. As long as we expect wit to be
stationary, we do not introduce any deterministic time trend in the equation. Zit
includes the same variables as the Xit plus a dummy variable, which works as the
exclusion restriction, equal to one if individual i is 65 years or older for men, and






are assumed to have
a trivariate normal distribution.
As with the working and contributing equations, to improve the goodness of our
simulations, we assume that wages are also a function of some individual
unobserved characteristics, which are time invariant and constant across regimes.
As explained before, each individual in the sample is observed at most four times in
which he/she can be in regime 0 (working but not contributing) or regime 1
17 We use Stata command movestay (Lokshin and Sajaia 2004).
18 Wages are deflated using the Wage Index of Manufactures.
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(working and contributing). Thus, once Eqs. (13) and (14) are estimated, the
individual effect mi is recovered as follows:
m^i ¼
PTi
t¼1 wit  E w^itjIit ¼ 0;Xitð Þð Þ þ
PTi
t¼1 wit  E w^itjIit ¼ 1;Xitð Þð Þ
Ti
: ð15Þ
Conditional expectations in (13) and (14) are, respectively:
E w^itjIit ¼ 0;Xitð Þ ¼ Xitb^0  r^0q^0
/ c^Zitð Þ
1 U c^Zitð Þ ð16Þ
E w^itjIit ¼ 1;Xitð Þ ¼ Xitb^1 þ r^1q^1
/ c^Zitð Þ
U c^Zitð Þ ð17Þ
where r^0 and r^1 are the estimated standard deviations of the errors e0it and e
1
it
respectively; while q^0 and q^1 are the estimated correlation coefficients between uit
and e0it and e
1
it, respectively. /(…) and U(…) are the normal pdf and cdf,
respectively.
Predictions according to Eqs. (13) and (14) can only be computed for the
individuals in the sample, e.g. individuals for which we can compute the individual
effects. But the model is used to predict the labor income flow of ‘‘newborn’’
individuals. In this case, we simulate the individual effects19:
~mi ¼ r^m~zi ð18Þ
where r^m is the standard deviation of the individual effect v^i. ~zi is a pseudo-random
draw from a Standard Normal distribution. Thus, the labor income stream of the
newborn individuals is computed as follows:
ln ~wit ¼ Xitb^0 þ ~mi  r^0q^0
/ c^Zitð Þ
1 U c^Zitð Þ if
~Lit ¼ 1 and ~Cit ¼ 0 ð19Þ
ln ~wit ¼ Xitb^1 þ ~mi þ r^1q^1
/ c^Zitð Þ
U c^Zitð Þ if
~Lit ¼ 1 and ~Cit ¼ 1: ð20Þ
5.3 Computation of SS contributions and benefits
Based on the simulated work and income histories, we compute social contributions
and benefits according to the existing laws as described in Sect. 3. We assume that
individuals leave no survivors and suffer no sickness or disability. We also assume
that all individuals claim their retirement benefits as soon as they are eligible to do
so.
19 The implicit assumption here is that the distribution of the individual effects does not vary with age or
cohort.
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5.4 Computation of pre- and post-social-security lifetime labor income,
and distribution indexes
The expected pre-SS lifetime labor income is the present value of the expected
simulated labor income:
W rð Þ ¼
Xa¼r1
a¼0
p að ÞW að Þ 1þ qð Þa ð21Þ
where, r is age at retirement; p að Þ is the probability of worker’s survival at age a;
W að Þ is total labor cost (including employee and employer contributions) at age a; q
is the discount rate (we use a 3 % rate).
We compute the lifetime SSW as an indicator of SS transfers. SSW is the present
value of expected net transfers to SS. It can be obtained as the sum of the discounted
expected flows of old-age pensions PBð Þ net of contributions SSCð Þ.








p að ÞC að Þ 1þ qð Þa ð24Þ
where, max age is the maximum potential age; B a; rð Þ is the amount of retirement
benefits at age a conditional on retirement at age r; and C að Þ is the amount of
contributions (both by the employee and the employer) to the SS at ages a, ex-
cluding health insurance contributions.
Finally, the expected post-SS lifetime labor income is defined as W rð Þ þ SSW:
6 Results
As pointed out in Sect. 3, even when is possible a priori to distinguish between the
distributional effects of different SS arrangements, it becomes mostly an empirical
matter. In our case, to assess the redistributive impact of social security we use some
descriptive statistics of pre-SS lifetime labor income, SSW, and SSW to pre-SS
labor income ratio. We also calculate two additional indexes, the Gini coefficient
(for pre- and post-SS lifetime labor incomes) and the Reynolds–Smolensky-type
index of net redistributive effect (Lambert 1993, p 256). This index assesses the
redistributive impact of a program computing the area between the Lorenz pre-
program income and the concentration post-program income. A positive (negative)
value indicates that the program reduces (increases) inequality.20
20 The Gini coefficients and the Reynolds–Somelinsky index were estimated using DASP (Araar and
Duclos 2009).
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For each population group we work with a simulated population of 10,000
individuals, starting at an age of 18-year-old. Each individual potentially work until
he/she is 69-year-old (inclusive) if he/she does not retire earlier. The maximum age
an individual lives is 100-year-old. In Eqs. (1, 2) and (13, 14) two dummies are
included to control for the level of education (see Tables 5, 7 for a definition of
these variables). These dummies are assigned following the proportion in the
samples used for the estimation of Eqs. (1, 2). Even when some education levels are
completed at an age older than 18, we assume that the proportion of population with
such level of education has it from the beginning of the simulated period. In the case
of the selection equation we also include a dummy variable equal to one if the
individual is male/female and 65/60 years or older.21
Table 5 reports the results for the working and contribution status equations. In
results do not reported here we obtained that for women in the private sector the
IMR was not statistically significant, also the selection model generates too low
simulated contribution densities when comparing with observed ones. Thus, for
women in the private sector, we estimate Eqs. (1) and (2) without assuming the two
error terms are correlated between them.
For the most of the variables we obtain the expected signs. In the case of the age
effect, the interpretation is more difficult since this variable enter the regression
through a cubic polynomial, a better picture is given by Fig. 1 that shows the
observed and in-sample simulated densities. The goodness of fit is quite high when
measured by the proportion of correct predictions for the in-sample simulations (see
Table 6). In Fig. 2 we compare observed contribution densities with out-of-sample
simulations, here again the goodness of fit appear to be quite high.
With regards to the income equation, the results are reported in Table 7. As
expected the education dummies are positive and increasing in the level of
education, they are always statistically significant. For the age coefficients these are
mostly also significant.
Tables 8, 9 and 10 show some statistics about the simulated populations in
relation to the history of contribution and access to a retirement benefit. We assume
that each individual retires as soon as he/she meets the required conditions. Thus, it
comes as no surprise that the average age of retirement is close to the minimum
required age, especially in the case of men (see Table 8). Table 9 shows that the
proportion of the simulated populations that access to a retirement benefit,
excluding those that never contributed, is higher for public workers. Also, a higher
proportion of men access to a benefit than women, independently of the sector they
work in, but this difference is very much important in the case of the private sector,
which does not come as a surprise since for women in the private sector our sample
shows only a 27.7 % of cases with a declared contribution status (this percentage
goes up to 47.3 % when the reference group are those that declare a working status),
while for men the percentage is 58.9 % (71.7 %). Finally, in Table 10 we report the
average years of contributions of the simulated populations. The average length of
21 Even when the household survey has a wide range of additional variables, both at the individual and
the household levels, we are restricted to using deterministic variables that can be predicted over the life
of each individual.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 1 Observed and in-sample simulated contribution densities by age. a Share of overall sample.
b Share of sample with a working status. Source: own calculations
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contributions is longer in the public than in the private sector (considering all
individuals, regardless of whether they have access to a retirement benefit). This
outcome is surely a reflection of the higher labor stability of public workers relative
to private ones. Because of men need to contribute, at least, until they are 65-year-
old while for women the minimum age is 60 years, men contribute more than
women. When we restrict the analysis only to individuals that access to a pension
benefit, the years of contributions are in all cases above the minimum requirement.
With regards to the redistributive effects of the social security system, we first
present the results for a benchmark case in which we work with the following
assumptions, which are standard in the literature:
• A discount rate of 3 %.
• Pre- and post-SS lifetime labor incomes are calculated considering only labor
income subject to contributions (~Lit ¼ 1 and ~Cit ¼ 1).
After discussing the results of the baseline scenario we run different sensitivity
analyses:
• Two alternative discount rates are considered: 1 and 2 %.
• Pre- and post-SS lifetime labor incomes are calculated excluding employer and
employee contributions.
• Pre- and post-SS lifetime labor incomes are calculated not only including labor
income subject to contributions, but also labor income from informal jobs over
which no contributions are made (~Lit ¼ 1 and ~Cit ¼ 0).
• A scenario that considers a weak enforcement of the eligibility conditions.
• A counterfactual exercise in which we assume that all labor is formal, so every
time an individual works we assume he/she contributes.
Table 6 In sample simulations:
right predictions
The simulated status matches
the observed status
Source: own calculations
Private sector Public sector
Female Male Female Male
(a) Working status
Not working 76.2 66.2 70.9 69.0
Working 83.4 90.6 94.8 96.6
Total 80.4 86.3 91.8 95.0
(b) Contribution status
Does not contribute 93.5 82.6 83.2 75.5
Contributes 86.0 88.3 94.9 95.7
Total 91.4 86.0 92.5 93.5
(c) Contribution status (conditional on working)
Does not contribute 92.6 82.4 82.3 73.5
Contributes 86.0 88.3 94.9 95.7
Total 89.5 86.6 93.8 94.4






























Fig. 2 Observed and out-of-sample simulated contribution densities by age. a Share of overall sample.
b Share of sample with a working status. Note the unemployment rates used for the simulated densities
are 15.3 for men and 17.4 for women. These figures are the average rates for the period covered by the
samples used to estimate Eqs. (1) and (2). Source: own calculations
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6.1 The baseline scenario
In Table 11, we present some descriptive statistics for the simulated populations for
the pre-SS lifetime labor income, SSW, and SSW to pre-SS lifetime labor income
ratio. Average expected pre-SS lifetime labor income goes between 111.2 thousand
for women in the private sector to 263.4 thousand for men in the public sector. In the






Unemployment rate used in simulations: 8 %
People retire as soon as they meet the required conditions
Source: own calculations






Unemployment rate used in simulations: 8 %
Source: own calculations
a Includes people that did not contribute while working
b Excludes people that did not contribute while working
Table 10 Average number of years of contribution of simulated populations
Group a b c
Private-female 12.9 15.4 31.2
Private-male 29.1 29.6 37.5
Public-female 29.1 29.1 32.8
Public-male 37.6 37.6 38.8
Unemployment rate used in simulations: 8 %
People retire as soon as they meet the required conditions
Source: own calculations
a Includes people that do not access to a retirement benefit, independently of the contribution status while
working
b Includes people that do not access to a retirement benefit, only with a contributing status while working
c Includes only people who access to a retirement benefit
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case of men, the difference between public and private sector is quite less important
than for the case of women, 20 % in the case of men against a 70 % for women. Men,
on average, have a higher pre-SS lifetime labor income than women, especially in the
private sector with an average value 97 % higher than that of women, while in the
public sector the difference is 39 %. This important difference against women in the
private sector is a reflection of their much lower probability of working.
The simulated populations show a large degree of income dispersion given by the
ratio between the average income of the 99 and 1 percentile. These differences are
much important in the private sector, and for women than for men. As expected, the
distributions are skewed to the right, with the median pre-SS lifetime labor income
consistently lower than the mean values.
It comes as no surprise that the average SSW is never positive since there is an
important part of contributions, those made by the employer that has no effect on the
amount of the pension benefit, while the PBU, which is not related to the
contributions, is for most cases the smallest part of the total retirement benefit.
Table 11 Pre-social security lifetime labor income and social security wealth (in thousands of June 2011
US dollars)
Pre-SS labor income SSW SSW/pre-SS labor income
Private-male
Mean 219.1 -36.2 -18.0
P1 3.2 -119.6 -21.5
Median 176.6 -28.2 -16.6
P99 793.0 -0.7 -14.0
Skewness 1.6 -1.1 -0.2
Private-female
Mean 111.2 -16.6 -19.0
P1 0.4 -74.9 -21.5
Median 61.6 -13.1 -21.5
P99 626.4 -0.1 -9.5
Skewness 2.5 -1.7 1.2
Public-male
Mean 263.4 -40.8 -15.6
P1 34.6 -112.6 -21.5
Median 229.0 -35.2 -15.5
P99 834.2 -7.4 -12.6
Skewness 1.6 -0.9 -1.6
Public-female
Mean 189.1 -19.5 -12.1
P1 7.2 -69.5 -21.5
Median 153.5 -14.0 -9.9
P99 667.9 -1.6 -7.1
Skewness 1.6 -1.6 -1.1
Source: own calculations
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Average SSW ranges from -40.8 thousand (men in the public sector) to -16.6
thousand (women in the private sector). SSW is considerably more negative for men
than for women, with 2.1–1 relation in the public sector and 2.2–1 in the private sector.
The differences between public and private sectors are less important, either for men
(10 %) or for women (20 %). Measured by the difference between percentiles 1 and
99, within each category, SSW shows a higher dispersion among men than among
women. On average, the SSW to pre-SS lifetime labor income ratio ranges from
-19 % among women in the private sector to -12.1 % among women in the public
sector. Ranked by this ratio, there is an important dispersion, as for percentile 1 the
ratio is about-21.5 %, while for percentile 99 its range is between-14 and-7.1 %.
The results just summarized show that social security redistributes wealth in the
case of Argentina. We now move to look in what direction this redistribution goes.
Figure 3 show the relationship between pre-SS lifetime labor income and SSW. The
negative slope would suggest that the redistribution is progressive, the greater the
pre-SS labor income the lower is SSW. However, it is possible to observe a certain
degree of dispersion, which reflects some sort of redistribution but which does not
reduce inequality. Similar results were found for Brazil (Zylberstajn 2011) and
Uruguay (Forteza and Mussio 2012).22 Liebman (2001) points out to the same issue
for the United States. Also, there appears to be different sub-groups within each of
the four population groups.
Table 12 reports the Gini coefficients for pre- and post-SS lifetime labor
incomes. The results show that the system is regressive for men in the private sector
and women in the public sector (in both cases the Gini increases a 1.5 %,
approximately 0.6 ppt.); while not surprisingly there is a considerable regressive-
ness for women in the private sector (the Gini increases a 2.9 %, 1.7 ppt.). For men
in the public sector the system is slightly progressive (the Gini falls 0.2 %, 0.05
ppt.).
The same pattern emerges when looking at the Reynolds–Smolensky-type index
(see Table 13). The index is negative for the first three groups, especially for women
in the private sector, while it is positive for men in the public sector.
The failure of the current Argentinean PAYG-DB social security program to
reduce inter-generational inequality represents a puzzle. The vesting period
condition might help explain it. A possible explanation for our results is that as
Forteza et al. (2009) show, large segments of the population have a low
probability of having contributed 30 or more years when they reach retirement
ages, and this probability is particularly low among low-income individuals.
Forteza and Ourens (2012) show that the implicit rate of return on contributions
paid to these programs is very low when individuals have short contribution
histories. Hence, low-income individuals might be getting a bad deal from social
security because they have short histories of contribution. Figure 4 shows the
kernel densities for the average labor cost per year of contribution distinguishing
between people that contributed to the system and do not get a retirement benefit
and those who do. It is very clear from the simulated data that low-wage earners
22 For Chile, Fajnzylber (2011) finds out that the introduction in 2008 of a non-contributory component
into the otherwise actuarially fair individual account scheme, meant a progressive redistribution.
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have a much lower chance of fulfilling with the conditions the system requires to
obtain a pension at the age of retirement.23
6.2 Sensitivity analysis24
6.2.1 Discount rates
The use of a 3 % discount rate is a standard practice in the literature. In Table 14 we
report also the redistributive effects of using two alternative discount rates: 1 and
2 %. A lower discount rate gives more weight to the income received during the
retirement years in relation to the income received in the earlier years of the


































pre-SS labor income (thousands June 2011 USD)
Fig. 3 Social security wealth and lifetime labor income. Source: own calculations
23 A very parsimonious linear probability model such as Ri ¼ d1 ~gCi þ d2 ln wið Þ þ ui, where Ri ¼ 1 if the
person get a retirement benefit, and zero otherwise, ~gCi is the simulated individual fixed effect obtained
from Eq. (1), and wi is the average wage (including employer and employee contributions) per year of
contribution, explains a large proportion of the probability of getting a pension, with a 1 % increase in the
average wage increasing the probability of getting a pension between 0.07 and 0.30 % depending on the
type of worker and the sector, if we exclude women in the private sector the effect ranges between 0.20
and 0.30 %.
24 Unless it is explicitly stated otherwise, each sensitivity analysis maintains the assumptions
of the baseline scenario, with the exception of the assumption which is the subject of the sensitivity
analysis.
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for a retirement benefit, which are also those with lower income during their
working life, it is not a surprise that the system become much more regressive when
using lower discount rates for the three groups the system is already regressive when
using a discount rates of 3 % (men and women in the private sector, and women in
the public sector), while progressiveness increases when the system is already
progressive under a discount rate of 3 % (men in the public sector).
6.2.2 Alternative measures of pre- and post-SS lifetime labor incomes
The percentage of total labor cost represented by contributions made by workers and
employers is substantial, 27 % of the taxable wage, and 30 % of the net wage
received by the employees. This is probably an important reason for our result that
SSW is negative in all cases. The inclusion of contributions by employees and
employers in the formulas for pre- and post-SS lifetime labor incomes assumes
implicitly that the burden of contributions falls on workers, this strategy is probably
the most common in the literature, however the distribution of the burden is clearly
an empirical issue (Saez et al. 2012).
To look into this issue we run the simulations using alternative definitions of pre-
and post-SS lifetime labor incomes, which exclude employer and employee
Table 12 Gini coefficients of
lifetime labor income before and
after social security
Source: own calculations
Estimate LB (95 %) UB (95 %)
Private-female
Pre-SS 0.5830 0.5763 0.5897
Post-SS 0.6001 0.5934 0.6067
Private-male
Pre-SS 0.4280 0.4226 0.4334
Post-SS 0.4343 0.4286 0.4399
Public-female
Pre-SS 0.3998 0.3947 0.4048
Post-SS 0.4056 0.4004 0.4109
Public-male
Pre-SS 0.3405 0.3359 0.3451
Post-SS 0.3400 0.3352 0.3448
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contributions. Working in this way, pension benefits are treated as any other social
program and we ignore the contributions in the calculation. We consider no
behavioral responses, in the sense that we assume that wages are not affected
regardless of how pre- and pos-SS lifetime labor incomes are defined.
The results of excluding contributions from pre- and post-SS lifetime labor
incomes are reported in Table 15. As we can see, the results are not homogeneous
across the four population groups, with SS becoming more regressive for women in
the private sector, more progressive for men in the public sector, while for men in
the private sector and women in the public sector there is a reduction in the
regressivity of SS.
6.2.3 The role of informal labor income
An important element of the labor market in Argentina is the high participation of
informal jobs, over which no contributions are made. The inclusion into pre- and
post-SS lifetime labor incomes of earnings from jobs for which there were no
contributions, informal income, means an important reduction in the Gini
coefficients of pre- and post-SS lifetime labor incomes. This result derives from
the fact that those for whom informal income is an important part of their pre-SS
lifetime labor earnings are mostly low-wage earners, so the inclusion of this type of
income increases the participation of the low end of the income distribution.
Also, with the inclusion of informal labor the redistributive nature of the system
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Fig. 4 Density distributions of average labor cost per year of contribution (includes employee and
employer contributions). Source: own calculations
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public sector, and it becomes also now progressive for men and women in the
private sector, while the negative effect observed in the public sector for women is
now just one-third of the value obtained when only formal jobs were taken into
account. The same results emerge when using the Reynolds–Smolensky-type index,
SS is always progressive but for women in the public sector. Not surprisingly, the
Table 14 Redistributive effects under different discount rates
Discount rate (%) Private sector Public sector
Female Male Female Male
(A) Gini coefficients
Pre-SS 1 0.5703 0.4218 0.3870 0.3388
2 0.5768 0.4248 0.3934 0.3396
3 0.5830 0.4280 0.3998 0.3405
Post-SS 1 0.6013 0.4322 0.3973 0.3359
2 0.5999 0.4328 0.4012 0.3381
3 0.6001 0.4343 0.4056 0.3400
Discount rate
1 % 2 % 3 %
(B) Reynolds–Smolensky index of effective progression
Private-female -3.0083 -2.2569 -1.6805
Private-male -1.0168 -0.7912 -0.6208
Public-female -0.9557 -0.7312 -0.5591
Public-male 0.2947 0.1600 0.0579
Source: own calculations
Table 15 Redistributive effects under alternative definitions of pre- and post-SS lifetime labor incomes
Private sector Public sector
Female Male Female Male
(A) Gini coefficients
Total labor costs and contributionsa
Pre-SS 0.5830 0.4280 0.3998 0.3405
Post-SS 0.6001 0.4343 0.4056 0.3400
Net salary and no contributions
Pre-SS 0.5830 0.4280 0.3998 0.3405
Post-SS 0.6018 0.4330 0.4054 0.3366
(B) Reynolds–Smolensky index of effective progression
Total labor costs and contributionsa -1.6805 -0.6208 -0.5591 0.0579
Net salary and no contributions -1.8423 -0.4865 -0.5269 0.3925
Source: own calculations
a Baseline scenario
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main improvement of the inclusion of the informal income takes place in the private
sector, especially for women, where the incidence of informal labor is much
important.
An interesting result from the inclusion of informal income arises when we use
the alternative definitions of pre- and post-SS lifetime labor incomes, which exclude
employee and employer contributions. Now, with the only exception of men in the
public sector, the SS system is always regressive, and moreover, the regressivity of
the system is stronger than when informal income is excluded. This result can be
explained by the fact that when pre- and post-SS lifetime labor incomes exclude
employee and employer contributions, Social Security works like an untied transfer
program improving the conditions of those who benefit from it,25 which as we saw
earlier (see Fig. 4) are the ones with higher wages, since low-wage workers are less
likely to fulfill the conditions to access a retirement benefit.
6.2.4 A weak enforcement of the law
A de facto progressive component, maybe one of the most important, is the weak
enforcement of the law, in particular with regards to if a person fulfills the minimum
requirements to access a retirement benefit. To account for the de facto application of
the law we run an alternative scenario under a weak enforcement of the conditions to
access to a benefit. We assume that everyone that having worked, when reaching
70-year-old does not have access to a retirement benefit, is granted the PBU. As
reported in Table 17, not surprisingly, a scenario with a weak enforcement of the law
reduces importantly the regressiveness of the system. This improvement is of a larger
magnitude in the private than in the public sector, and for women than for men. These
results are mainly driven by the lower probability that people in the private sector,
and particularly women, have of fulfilling the conditions to access to a retirement
Table 16 Redistributive effects including informal jobs income
Private sector Public sector
Female Male Female Male
(A) Gini coefficients
Total labor costs and contributions
Pre-SS 0.5454 0.3715 0.3604 0.3198
Post-SS 0.5434 0.3658 0.3622 0.3158
Net salary and no contributions
Pre-SS 0.5052 0.3416 0.3422 0.3097
Post-SS 0.5279 0.3517 0.3553 0.3083
(B) Reynolds–Smolensky index of effective progression
Total labor costs and contributions 0.2369 0.5936 -0.1510 0.4125
Net salary and no contributions -2.2467 -0.9935 -1.2844 0.1443
Source: own calculations
25 Let us remember that we assume no behavioral response, so wages are not affected regardless of how
SS is financed.
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benefit. It emerges clearly and once again without to be a surprise, the case of women
in the private sector, which as shown before have a much lower probability of
obtaining a retirement benefit if the law is strictly enforced.
6.2.5 A counterfactual with no informal jobs
Finally, we run a scenario under the assumption that there are no informal jobs, so
every time an individual is working we assume he/she contributes to SS. In this
case, we use the results of the labor status equation (Eq. 1) to calculate the working
histories. Then we estimate a new single-equation random effect model to generate
the income histories.26 Working this way has the drawback that for those individuals
in the sample who are in an informal job, we use their observed wage, instead of the
wage he/she would have received if he/she would have had a formal job. This would
bias downward the individual effect for these individuals, and so also their
simulated income history.
As Table 18A shows, there is an important increase in the share of population
that would have access to a retirement benefit (see Table 9 for a comparison with
the baseline scenario). With regards to the distributive impacts of SS, now the
system is almost neutral, showing a slight progressiveness (see Table 18B) but for
women in the private sector. However, in this last case the Gini coefficient increases
only 0.4 %, just a seventh of the increase obtained for the baseline scenario. This
last result makes very clear the importance of reducing the incidence of informal
labor.
Finally, an issue that cannot be ignored, as it is essential for all the results
presented above, is the effect of using for the estimates of a data set that goes back
to before the year for which the simulations are run, and perhaps even more
important when a different legal framework was in place.2728 From a purely
practical perspective, and as pointed out before, one of the reasons for not working
Table 17 Redistributive effects














26 The results for these estimates are available upon request.
27 I thank to two anonymous referees for bringing this point to my attention.
28 As described in Sect. 3.1, between 1994 and 2003 coexisted a PAYG-DB system together with a IA-
DC system.
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with a more recent period of time for the estimation of our equations is that starting
in the second half of 2003 the EPH was subject to an important methodological
change that impedes us to extend the period of analysis. Also, because of the timing
when households are surveyed, the new EPH is less suitable for the purposes of the
present study.29 A second reason, but by no means less important, is the growing
suspicions about the quality and truthfulness of the official statistics, which
originally was limited to consumer prices, and which later extended to statistics
about poverty, employment, and finally also to GDP figures.
The implicit assumption for using our data for the estimation of the working and
contribution statuses is that changes in the legal framework governing the retirement
benefits of the social security system had no effect on labor market and contribution
behavior, or at least they were not as important to change the results substantially.
To grasp an idea of how strong is this assumption of no behavioral response, in an
exercise which we do not report here because of matter of space,30 we simulated the
working and contribution densities for the period 2009–2011,31 when the new
retirement regime was in place, using the estimates reported in Table 5. For the four
population groups we were able to replicate the age patterns of working and
contributions densities observed during 2009–2001. Additionally, for men both in
Table 18 Scenario with no informal jobs
Group %











Unemployment rate used in simulations: 8 %
Source: own calculations
29 In the old EPH, each individual in a household was surveyed during four consecutive times. Under the
new EPH, each individual is surveyed also four times, but now instead of these being consecutive with an
equal lapse of between surveys, each person is included into the sample during two consecutive quarters,
then is dropped the next two quarters, and finally included again for two additional quarters. The different
lapses of time between surveys, 3 months between the first and the second and between the third and the
fourth, and 6 months between the second and the third, introduces an additional difficulty in the
estimations.
30 These are available from the author upon request.
31 From 2012, official employment figures are regarded as highly suspicious.
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the private and public sectors, the magnitude of the densities are quite close. Instead,
for women in the case of the contribution status, especially in the public sector,
simulated densities are lower than the observed ones. Thus, considering that one of
the main reasons for our results is that an important proportion of individuals fail to
comply with the requirement about the minimum number of years of contributions,
especially in the case of women, the regressiveness of social security as reported
previously should be interpreted as a worst-case scenario. However, having said the
latter, taking into account the robustness of the results to the different sensitivity
analysis, especially the one that allows for a weak enforcement of the law, and even
more the counterfactual with no informal labor, the main message which is that, in
its current state, the retirement benefit pillar of social security in Argentina would
not be working as an effective and efficient tool to pursue a more progressive intra-
generational distribution of income, remains the most likely outcome.
7 Concluding remarks
Argentina social security system, based on a PAYG-DB scheme, appears to be
regressive, especially for women working in the private sector. This result is robust
to using alternative discount rates, and to different definitions of pre-and post-SS
lifetime labor incomes.
The main finding that the system appears to be regressive constitutes, a priori, a
puzzle, that might find explanation in the lower probability that low-income earners
have of accessing to a retirement benefit as reported in Forteza et al. (2009). This
effect is much more important in the case of the private sector, especially for
women.
As pointed out in Sect. 1, our results are at odds with the idea that PAYG-DB
systems are mostly progressive, while systems based on individual accounts are
mostly neutral. One possible explanation for the results we obtain here is that, to the
system to be financially sustainable, there is a need for strict eligibility conditions,
as well as low rates of replacement. Thus, the fact that low-wage earners, especially
women in the private sector, have a high probability of working in the informal
sector plays a crucial role, since they cannot fulfill the conditions for accessing to a
retirement benefit loosing all their contributions.
To grasp an idea of the role of eligibility conditions, we run some alternative
simulations. First, we obtain that the system becomes slightly progressive when
inequality measures are calculated on the basis of income that also include that
derived from jobs for which people do not make contributions.32 This result is
explained by the fact that according to our simulations are low-earner individuals,
who show lower probabilities of being entitled for a retirement benefit, the ones that
derive most of their labor income from jobs for which they do not make
contributions. This last result means that low-earner workers have low incentives to
look for jobs in the formal sector, with the negative externalities that this kind of
32 This result is reversed when pre- and post-SS lifetime incomes are defined such that we exclude
contributions of employees and employers.
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behavior brings during the working life, such as lack of health service coverage.
Second, when we assume a weak enforcement of the social security law, the PAYG-
DB system becomes less regressive. These changes are more likely for women than
for men and in the private than in the public sector. Both cases could be explained,
once again, because women and those working in the private sector have lower
probability of fulfilling the conditions to have access to a retirement benefit. Finally,
assuming the removal of the informal labor market, the system becomes almost
neutral, even showing a small level of progressivity.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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